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Today hackers disguise their attacks by launching
them form a set of compromised hosts distributed
across the Internet. It is very diﬃcult to defend
against these attacks or to track down their origin.
Commercially available intrusion detection systems
can signal the occurrence of limited known types of at-
tacks. New types of attacks are launched regularly but
these tools are not eﬀective in detecting them. Human
experts are still the key tool for identifying, tracking,
and disabling new attacks. Often this involves experts
from many organizations working together to share
their observations, hypothesis, and attack signatures.
Unfortunately, today these experts have few tools that
help them to automate this process.
In this project we recognize that human experts
will remain a critical part in the process of identi-
fying, tracking and disabling computer attacks. We
also recognize that an important part of the discov-
ery, analysis, and defense against new distributed at-
tacks is the cooperation that occurs between experts
across diﬀerent organizations. Many installations do
not have the expertise necessary to develop full attack
analyses. Our goal is to build automated tools for
computer experts and system administrators to:
• identify the characteristics of an attack given data
from network sensors
• develop a hypothesis about the nature and origin
of the attack
• share that hypothesis with security managers
from other sites
• test that hypothesis at those other sites and co-
ordinate the results of testing
• archive the data necessary for use as evidence in
later law-enforcement actions
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The main diﬃculties in catching the bad hackers
arise because (1) existing system logs are too large;
(2) existing system logs do not contain all the in-
formation that could be useful in tracking down an
intruder; and (3) attacks often come from multiple
sources and spawn processes at multiple destinations
but there is no way of coordinating logs across ad-
ministrative domains. We believe that mobile agent
systems can play a key role in addressing these diﬃ-
culties. Because formulating a correct hypothesis re-
quires coordinating and correlating system logs from
multiple locations, mobile agents are a well-suited pro-
cessing paradigm. A mobile agent can travel to the lo-
cation of the system logs, ﬁlter out the time-relevant or
location-relevant information from these logs, and cor-
relate all this information without necessitating costly
ﬁle transfers across the net.
We envision a new generation of security systems
that work across administrative domains and use mo-
bile agent technology to share and correlate system
logs. We believe it is feasible to organize groups of
computers that have diﬀerent administrative domains
as logical entities and use a mobile agent system to
access, share, and correlate its system logs. Such
alliances are already becoming a reality. For exam-
ple, the Information Technology Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) is a consortium of 19
technology giants including Microsoft and Oracle who
joined forces recently to share security data, to protect
themselves from hackers by sharing reports of elec-
tronic threats, incidents, solutions and countermea-
sures.
The mobile agent security system can be built on
top of any mobile agent system, such as our own
D’Agents system. The main component of such a sys-
tem would be (1) the basic agent infrastructure; (2) a
module for the distributed capturing and accessing of
security logs; (3) a module for correlating data from
the security logs; and (4) a module for formulating at-
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tack hypotheses based on the output of the correlation
module.
We have already developed D’Agents, which we en-
vision as the infrastructure for our proposed security
system. We have also developed a module for the dis-
tributed capturing and accessing of security logs and
more generally, of distributed information. We are in
the process of developing the last two modules.
Serval, our scalable information-retrieval server, is
based on mobile agents. This server is hosted on
a cluster of Linux workstations, each running the
D’Agents execution environment and each containing
a portion of the document collection. Agents wishing
to search the collection may jump to any one of the
hosts, connect to the document index, and query the
index for relevant documents. Then, they can choose
to read the documents through an internal Network
File System or by jumping to each host to examine
the documents locally. The goal is to examine issues
in constructing scalable mobile-agent services, balanc-
ing load among the hosts, and allowing the agents au-
tonomy in deciding how best to service their query.
We plan to use Serval for intrusion detection by us-
ing the same infrastructure to store network and host
log data. The database can index the logs for quick
searching. Network administration tools can use mo-
bile agents to examine the data collection eﬃciently
and ﬂexibly, because complex analyses can be encoded
as mobile agents, sent to the Serval cluster, and exam-
ine the data with high-speed local access to the data.
We plan to further extend the Serval infrastructure
beyond its specialized cluster. In a local-area network,
intrusion-detection data is inherently collected at dis-
tributed sites, at the hosts or network segments where
intrusions may occur. The log data is stored in lo-
cal hosts (possibly specialized secure logging hosts),
avoiding the need to transmit it to distant parts of
the network. By installing the Serval software on these
log hosts, we create a “virtual Serval cluster” as a dis-
tributed network service. Analysis tools can launch
a mobile agent into any one of these log hosts, and
the mobile agent can search the distributed index and
jump to other log hosts as needed to examine the log
data.
Consider a typical network intrusion. After a recon-
naissance phase (i.e., the hacker scans a certain net-
work to ﬁnd hosts that exhibit a given vulnerable ser-
vice), a vulnerability is exploited, for example execut-
ing a buﬀer overﬂow attack against a machine with ftp
enabled. This allows the hacker to overcome the stan-
dard login process and gain root privileges on the com-
promised machine. The hacker, then, performs opera-
tions on the compromised machine (read/modify data,
install backdoors) and tries to compromise further in-
ternal machines of the same organization. These fur-
ther attacks are likely to be easier than the ﬁrst one,
since internal machines are often less protected than
the network’s perimeter. Trust relationships, shared
ﬁle systems, weak passwords are examples of common
internal weaknesses that an hacker could easily ex-
ploit.
Given this typical scenario, the Serval mobile agent
infrastructure is useful for the following goals. In the
incident handling phase, it can help identify all the
operations performed by the attacker and their time
sequence. Serval is necessary to completely restore the
compromised systems and avoid further attacks. In a
forensic analysis, it supports the correlation among
logs from diﬀerent machines and the retrieval of ev-
idence of the attack distributed among diﬀerent ma-
chines of the network, which is useful for proving the
damages caused by the attack. If a response strategy
is considered, the Serval infrastructure can be used to
stop the intrusion at its early stages, by isolating com-
promised machines. Such a response is necessary since
today it is unfeasible to assume that all attacks could
be blocked at the network perimeter.
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